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An agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, other than mutual promises to marry, is void unless a writing or memorandum expresses the consideration and is subscribed by the party to be charged or an authorized person.

Spouses may contract with each other, but their contracts remain subject to the rules governing persons in confidential relations.

A surviving spouse may waive some or all elective-share, homestead-allowance, exempt-property, and family-allowance rights before or after marriage through a written contract, agreement, or waiver signed after fair disclosure.

Goodwin construes section 43-8-72 and confirms that the scope of a surviving spouse's waiver depends on the agreement's language, including whether an all-rights clause reaches statutory benefits and pre-waiver testamentary benefits.

The proponent may satisfy Barnhill by showing either adequate consideration and a transaction fair, just, and equitable from the other spouse's perspective, or free and voluntary execution with competent independent advice and full knowledge of the interest in the estate and its approximate value.

Barnhill's first alternative requires adequate consideration and an entire transaction that was fair, just, and equitable from the resisting spouse's point of view; Hollar confirms the framework remains current.

Competent independent advice is part of Barnhill's second alternative, while Rhyne-Morris explains that lack of independent counsel is not by itself categorically fatal on every record.

Barnhill's second alternative requires full knowledge of the interest in the other party's estate and its approximate value; later decisions evaluate whether general knowledge was sufficient on their specific records.

Marriage may provide adequate consideration for a contemplated premarital bargain, but Alabama has no codified UPAA applicability date or single statutory transition rule for premarital agreements.

Hollar applies the Barnhill standard to both prenuptial and postnuptial agreements; a claimed later change must be classified and reviewed as an amendment, postnuptial bargain, or other interspousal contract under applicable formalities and confidential-relation rules.

Hollar affirmed nonenforcement where the trial court could find that the wife did not voluntarily sign and that the agreement was not fair under Barnhill.

Northington held that general knowledge of the other spouse's estate and what was being relinquished could satisfy Barnhill on a record involving negotiation and counsel even without proof of every exact asset value.

Rhyne-Morris states that independent counsel is preferred but not categorically required and remanded because the trial court had not properly resolved the agreement's Hawaii choice-of-law issue.

Brown upheld an agreement signed the day before the wedding on its particular evidence and confirms Alabama has no fixed premarital waiting period.

Walters recognizes enforcement of an alimony waiver in a valid premarital agreement, subject to Alabama's governing enforceability rules.

Walters enforced a clause specifically waiving divorce attorney fees unless enforcement would be inequitable and unjust.

A child's right to support is inherent and cannot be permanently waived by the parents; courts retain authority to impose or modify support under governing law.

An agreement made upon consideration of marriage, other than mutual promises to marry, is unenforceable against the party charged unless the agreement or a note or memorandum is written and subscribed by that party or an authorized agent.

Title 25 supplies mandatory dissolution, property, support, custody, and child-related rules that operate alongside any premarital agreement.

The separate Community Property Act instrument must be in a written document signed by both spouses, classify some or all property as community property, and begin with the statute's capital-letter warning; it is enforceable without consideration.

A qualifying community property agreement may address property rights, management, disposition, estate planning, nonprobate transfers, governing law, and other lawful property matters, but may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

A community property agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

People intending to marry may execute a community property agreement as if married, but it becomes effective only when they marry; the chapter's determination date is the latest of marriage, the instrument's effective date, or May 23, 1998.

A community property agreement may be amended or revoked only as the agreement itself permits or by a later community property agreement; the statute also contains a qualified surviving-spouse rule for nonprobate dispositions.

Section 34.77.090 supplies different enforcement formulations for agreements executed during marriage and before marriage, addressing voluntariness, execution-time unconscionability, disclosure, written waiver, and financial notice; the court decides unconscionability as a matter of law.

A surviving spouse may waive elective-share, homestead, exempt-property, and family-allowance rights before or after marriage in a signed writing; the statute preserves voluntariness and execution-time unconscionability plus disclosure, written-waiver, and knowledge safeguards.

Brooks recognizes legally procured and ostensibly fair premarital agreements and asks about fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation or material nondisclosure, execution-time unconscionability, and changed circumstances making enforcement unfair or unreasonable.

Material nondisclosure, misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, or duress can defeat enforcement under Brooks; the actual schedules, debts, values, and knowledge record must be preserved.

Andrew requires a combined, fact-specific evaluation of time to review, ability and opportunity to consult independent counsel meaningfully, and ability to understand the agreement; no single factor is dispositive and ordinary duress is not the exclusive test.

Alaska has no fixed statutory waiting-period safe harbor for an ordinary prenup; Andrew makes the actual time to receive, review, understand, and respond to the agreement essential to voluntariness.

The focus is not merely whether separate counsel appeared, but whether the party had the ability and opportunity to consult independent counsel in a meaningful way.

Ordinary contract interpretation applies, but a court may not add a benefit, fund, or promise the parties did not make merely to repair a one-sided agreement.

For an ordinary premarital agreement, the contemplated marriage supplies consideration; adequacy of the bargain is addressed through fairness rather than by inventing an unstated promise.

A valid prenup is persuasive but not conclusive evidence of intent to keep property separate; a court may examine the parties' treatment of particular assets and find transmutation while the agreement remains valid.

Alaska has no general UPAA amendment section for ordinary prenups; Compton distinguishes asset-specific transmutation evidence from formal modification or waiver of the agreement.

Kilkenny confirms the court first asks whether execution was voluntary, then whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed or later circumstances make enforcement unfair and unreasonable; it expressly notes Alaska has not adopted UPMAA.

A court may selectively strike terms made unfair or unreasonable by material changed circumstances without voiding the entire agreement, but it may not add new promises and must explain term-by-term choices sufficiently for appellate review.

Kilkenny holds that domestic violence and coercive financial control during marriage may be material changed circumstances making particular attorney-fee, support, or property-remedy restrictions unfair or unreasonable.

No private child-support waiver is valid without judicial scrutiny under Civil Rule 90.3, and parents may not contract around the child's right or the court's guideline and modification duties.

Trial courts, not parents, are the ultimate custody decision makers and are not bound by private agreements; current best-interests law controls.

An Arizona premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

An Arizona premarital agreement becomes effective on the parties' marriage.

The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

For the statutory unconscionability ground, Arizona also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, written waiver of further disclosure, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or obligations.

A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

If a marriage is determined to be void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Arizona lists property rights and management, disposition, spousal support, estate planning, insurance, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations as permitted subjects.

An Arizona premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

After marriage, an Arizona premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties.

An applicable limitations period for relief under a premarital agreement is tolled during marriage, while equitable defenses including laches and estoppel remain available.

A premarital agreement is a written agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage; property includes broad present, future, income, and earnings interests.

An agreement must be written, signed, and acknowledged by both parties; the 2017 amendment supplies four alternative acknowledgment methods.

Permitted subjects include property, disposition, support, estate planning, life insurance, governing law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations.

A premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

The agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by both parties.

A resisting party may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

The execution-time unconscionability ground also requires no fair disclosure, no qualifying written waiver after consulting counsel, and no adequate financial knowledge.

The disclosure branch asks whether further disclosure was expressly waived in writing after consulting legal counsel.

A court may require support as necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a support term at separation or dissolution.

For a void marriage, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Arkansas tolls limitations during marriage, preserves laches and estoppel, and applies the Act to agreements executed on or after July 1, 1987.

Banks applies section 9-11-406 and evaluates experience, education, financial knowledge, disclosure, waiver, counsel certification, and opportunity to read.

Mays affirmed enforcement after reviewing signature and witness proof, credibility, disclosed assets, knowledge, and the separate voluntariness and unconscionability paths.

Rogers concluded that partial property stipulations did not themselves formally revoke the entire agreement.

A premarital agreement must be written and signed by both parties.

The statute lists property, disposition, estate-planning, insurance, choice-of-law, and other lawful subjects.

A premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

California places counsel and unconscionability limits on premarital spousal-support provisions.

A premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by the parties.

The enforcement framework addresses voluntary execution, unconscionability, disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge.

The voluntariness framework includes counsel advisement, a seven-calendar-day period, and written protections for an unrepresented party.

If the marriage is void, the agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Colorado defines premarital and marital agreements, amendment, marital rights, property, records, and signatures, including electronic records and signatures.

The current part applies to agreements signed on or after July 1, 2014 and preserves rights under earlier agreements.

Chosen law requires a significant relationship at signing and no conflict with section 14-2-309 or fundamental Colorado public policy.

An agreement must be in a record and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Colorado permits modification of defined marital rights but bars specified child, domestic-violence, dissolution-penalty, and public-policy terms.

A premarital agreement takes effect on marriage; a marital agreement takes effect when both parties sign.

For a void marriage, a premarital agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

An agreement is unenforceable if the resisting party proves consent was involuntary or resulted from duress.

Access requires reasonable time to decide, locate counsel, obtain and consider advice, plus financial ability or paid reasonable fees when the other party is represented.

Unless represented at signing, a party must receive the prescribed conspicuous notice or a plain-language explanation of modified or waived rights.

Before signing, a party needs reasonably accurate property, liability, and income information plus good-faith values, or adequate knowledge or a reasonable basis for it.

An otherwise enforceable agreement is unenforceable to the extent a maintenance or attorney-fee term is unconscionable at enforcement.

A term may not adversely affect child support, and custodial-responsibility terms do not bind the court.

Colorado tolls limitations during marriage, preserves laches and estoppel, directs uniform construction, and limits E-SIGN preemption; HB 13-1204 took effect July 1, 2014.

Zander held the predecessor Act's writing-and-signature rule controlled and partial performance did not validate an oral agreement.

Williams concluded that legalistic waiver language was not the required plain-language explanation for an unrepresented signer.

A Connecticut premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Connecticut lists property rights and management, disposition, spousal support, estate planning, insurance, retirement-plan rights, choice of law, and personal rights and obligations as agreement subjects, subject to public policy and criminal statutes.

A Connecticut premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support, and child care, custody, visitation, and other child-affecting provisions remain subject to judicial review and modification.

A Connecticut premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage unless the agreement provides otherwise.

After marriage, a Connecticut premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties.

A Connecticut premarital agreement or amendment is not enforceable if the resisting party proves that it was not executed voluntarily.

Connecticut identifies unconscionability when the agreement was executed or when enforcement is sought, and assigns that issue to the court as a matter of law.

Before execution, Connecticut requires fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character, and value of the other party's property, financial obligations, and income for this enforcement safeguard.

Connecticut's enforcement statute asks whether the resisting party was afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel.

A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

If the marriage is held void or voidable, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Connecticut tolls an applicable limitations period during marriage while preserving equitable defenses, and the act does not affect the validity of agreements made before October 1, 1995.

A Delaware premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Delaware lists property rights and management, disposition, spousal support or alimony, estate planning, insurance, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations as permitted subjects.

A Delaware premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

A Delaware premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, a Delaware premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties.

The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

For Delaware's statutory unconscionability ground, the statute also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, written waiver of further disclosure, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.

If a marriage is determined to be void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

An applicable limitations period for relief under a premarital agreement is tolled while the parties are married, while equitable defenses including laches and estoppel remain available.

A premarital agreement must be written and signed by both parties.

Florida lists property, disposition, support, estate-planning, insurance, choice-of-law, and other lawful subjects.

A premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

After marriage, amendment, revocation, or abandonment requires a written agreement signed by the parties.

Florida addresses voluntary execution, fraud, duress, coercion, overreaching, and an unconscionability/disclosure framework.

A court may require support to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a support modification or elimination.

If the marriage is void, the agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Georgia defines an antenuptial agreement as a contract entered before marriage that determines the parties' property rights or future settlement issues, including year's support, spousal support, and equitable division; marriage is valuable consideration subject to existing just debts.

For agreements governed by the current statute, an antenuptial agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties, and attested by at least two witnesses, one of whom must be a notary public.

One of the at least two attesting witnesses required for a current Georgia antenuptial agreement must be a notary public.

Georgia directs liberal construction of antenuptial agreements and provides that lack of form or technical expression does not invalidate an otherwise qualifying agreement.

A person may voluntarily execute an antenuptial agreement; after marriage a spouse may convey property to the other spouse, subject to the rights of prior purchasers and creditors.

Georgia provides for equitable enforcement of an antenuptial agreement at the instance of the marriage parties and, after death, specified offspring or heirs under the referenced probate and equity provisions.

Title 19 supplies the current statutory context for antenuptial agreements, support, equitable division, custody, and related mandatory domestic-relations rules.

A child's right to support cannot be waived by the parents, so a private agreement cannot conclusively eliminate that right.

Custody and parenting determinations remain subject to the court's statutory best-interests analysis rather than becoming automatically binding through a premarital term.

Scherer asks whether the agreement resulted from fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts; whether it is unconscionable; and whether later facts and circumstances make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.

Scherer's second prong requires the proponent to show that the agreement was not unconscionable, including when the agreement limits spousal support or property remedies.

Scherer's third prong asks whether relevant later facts and circumstances, including unforeseen changes, make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.

Mallen enforced an agreement first presented roughly nine or ten days before the wedding on its particular record and confirms Georgia has no fixed statutory waiting period.

Mallen considered the party's consultation with an attorney, the advice received about limited time, and her later negotiation choices; Georgia's statute does not make independent counsel a categorical execution formality.

Mallen held that general knowledge of the character and extent of assets and income could suffice on its record even without precise income figures and considered the duty to inquire absent fraud or misrepresentation.

Mallen held that conditioning marriage on execution did not alone establish duress on its record and noted that engaged parties are not automatically treated as being in a confidential relationship.

Georgia's statutory definition expressly includes spousal-support and equitable-division issues, and Arlotta applies Scherer to terms limiting those default-law remedies.

Arlotta described the Scherer criteria as the governing enforceability framework and reversed a ruling that invalidated property and alimony limits merely because they differed from statutory default remedies.

The 2018 enactment defined antenuptial agreements and added today's writing, signature, two-witness, and notary requirements, effective July 1, 2018.

Under the former statutory text, Dove held that a then-existing two-witness marriage-contract rule did not govern divorce-focused premarital agreements and treated Scherer as the enforcement test.

The 2020 amendment revised section 19-3-66's cross-references for enforcement by offspring or heirs and became effective January 1, 2021.

Georgia's antenuptial article does not supply a UPAA-style amendment-and-revocation section; a claimed later change must be classified as an amendment, postnuptial settlement, conveyance, or separate contract under then-applicable law.

Pickren applies Scherer to a record involving financial disclosure, independent counsel, deliberation time, and an alimony waiver.

Hawaii defines a premarital agreement as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage, and defines property broadly to include present, future, legal, equitable, vested, contingent, real, personal, income, and earnings interests.

A Hawaii premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Permitted subjects include property rights and management, disposition, modification or elimination of spousal support, estate planning, life-insurance benefits, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations.

A Hawaii premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

A Hawaii premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by the parties and is enforceable without consideration.

The party resisting enforcement may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily as an alternative to the statute's unconscionability-and-disclosure branch.

Hawaii's execution-time unconscionability branch also requires no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver of further disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.

A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.

The court decides unconscionability as a matter of law; under L.R.O., the statutory branch requires both substantive and procedural unconscionability together with the disclosure conditions.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Hawaii tolls an applicable limitations period during marriage, preserves laches and estoppel, directs uniform construction, and identifies chapter 572D as the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act enacted in 1987.

Written premarital agreements entered before July 1, 1987 are valid and enforceable if otherwise valid as contracts.

L.R.O. adopted a totality framework considering wedding proximity or surprise, independent counsel or opportunity for counsel, bargaining inequality, asset disclosure, and understanding of the rights waived or the agreement's intent.

L.R.O. upheld the agreement despite same-day execution where credited findings showed prior delivery, negotiation, understanding, and an opportunity to obtain counsel.

L.R.O. held that section 572D-6(a)(2) requires both substantive and procedural unconscionability: substantive unconscionability concerns an unjustly disproportionate post-divorce economic result, while procedural unconscionability concerns inadequate financial knowledge at execution.

Idaho defines a premarital agreement as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage, and defines property broadly to include present, future, legal, equitable, vested, contingent, real, personal, income, and earnings interests.

An Idaho premarital agreement must be written and signed by both parties, is enforceable without consideration, and must also be executed and acknowledged or proved in the manner required for land conveyances.

When a marriage-settlement contract grants or affects real estate, Idaho requires recording in each county where that real estate is situated; a qualifying signed and acknowledged summary may be recorded, and recording or nonrecording has the same effect as for a real-property conveyance.

Permitted subjects include property rights and control, disposition, modification or elimination of spousal support, estate-planning arrangements, life-insurance benefits, choice of law, and other personal rights and obligations not violating public policy or criminal law.

An Idaho premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

An Idaho premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by the parties and is enforceable without consideration.

The party resisting enforcement in Idaho may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

Idaho's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.

A court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination at separation or dissolution.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Idaho tolls an applicable limitation period for a premarital-agreement claim during marriage, preserves equitable time defenses including laches and estoppel, directs uniform construction, and designates sections 32-921 through 32-929 as the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.

Kelly held that contractual provisions barring attorney fees and costs for issues concerning child custody, visitation, and support violate Idaho public policy, while separately applying the agreement's text to disputed property.

Neustadt held that the agreement's post-divorce life-insurance obligation was not void as against Idaho public policy because it required the insured party to procure a policy Idaho law allowed her to obtain for the named beneficiary.

Dunagan declined to enforce the parties' alleged oral agreement to keep finances separate because Idaho requires marriage settlements to be written, properly executed, and acknowledged or proved; the claimed partial performance did not cure the missing formalities.

A premarital agreement must be written and signed by both parties.

Illinois lists property, disposition, support, estate-planning, insurance, choice-of-law, and other lawful subjects.

A premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by the parties.

Illinois addresses voluntary execution and an unconscionability framework involving disclosure, written waiver, and adequate knowledge.

A court may require support to avoid undue hardship from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable when a support provision was executed.

If the marriage is void, the agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

An applicable limitations period is tolled during marriage while identified equitable defenses remain available.

Indiana's chapter applies to premarital agreements executed on or after July 1, 1995; earlier agreements require historical-law analysis.

Indiana defines a premarital agreement as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage, and defines property broadly to include present, future, legal, equitable, vested, contingent, real, personal, income, and earnings interests.

An Indiana premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Permitted subjects include property rights and management, disposition, modification or elimination of spousal maintenance, estate planning, life-insurance benefits, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations.

An Indiana premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

An Indiana premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

The party resisting enforcement must prove either involuntary execution or that the agreement was unconscionable when executed; the court decides unconscionability as a matter of law.

If a maintenance modification or elimination causes extreme hardship under circumstances not reasonably foreseeable when the agreement was executed, a court may require maintenance only to the extent necessary to avoid that hardship.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

An applicable limitations period for relief under a premarital agreement is tolled during marriage, while equitable defenses including laches and estoppel remain available.

Fetters held an agreement unconscionable on extraordinary facts including the wife's minority, poor reading ability, lack of independent advice and assets, extreme life-experience imbalance, and an entirely one-sided property result.

Fetters held that remaining married and delaying a challenge did not alone establish laches or estoppel; the record lacked the required detrimental reliance.

Harrill upheld voluntary execution where an experienced adult received a draft days before signing, had an opportunity to retain counsel, negotiated a change, signed more than a week before the wedding, and conceded the absence of fraud or misrepresentation.

Harrill explains that Indiana generally imposes no absolute duty to identify every separate asset, but a duty may arise from unique facts or from the agreement's own disclosure promises; omitted accounts were classified under that agreement's text.

Fetters applies execution-time unconscionability and considers bargaining-power disparity, one-sidedness or unfair surprise, economic circumstances, execution conditions, knowledge, and independent counsel.

An Iowa premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both prospective spouses and is enforceable without consideration other than marriage.

Iowa permits provisions addressing property rights and management, disposition, estate-planning arrangements, life-insurance benefits, choice of law, and other matters not violating public policy or a criminal statute.

An Iowa premarital agreement may not adversely affect the right of a spouse or child to support.

An Iowa premarital agreement becomes effective upon the parties' marriage.

After marriage, an Iowa premarital agreement may be revoked by a writing signed by both spouses, or without the other spouse's consent upon proof of a listed voluntariness, unconscionability, or disclosure ground.

The party resisting enforcement in Iowa may prove that execution was not voluntary or that the agreement was unconscionable when executed.

Iowa's disclosure ground examines whether the resisting party received fair and reasonable disclosure and lacked, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge of the other spouse's property or financial obligations.

If a provision or its application is unenforceable, Iowa directs severance without affecting provisions or applications that can operate without it.

In an action to revoke or enforce an Iowa premarital agreement, unconscionability is decided by the court as a matter of law.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

A limitations period for relief under an Iowa premarital agreement is tolled during marriage, while equitable defenses including laches and estoppel remain available.

Iowa chapter 596 took effect January 1, 1992, applies to agreements executed on or after that date, and does not affect the validity of earlier agreements under Iowa law.

Shanks interprets Iowa chapter 596's voluntariness and unconscionability standards and held the agreement before it voluntarily executed, conscionable, and enforceable.

Kansas defines a premarital agreement as one between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage, and defines property to include present, future, legal, equitable, vested, contingent, real, personal, income, and earnings interests.

A Kansas premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Kansas lists property rights and management, disposition, spousal support, estate planning, life-insurance death benefits, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations as permitted subjects.

A Kansas premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

A Kansas premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

The party resisting enforcement in Kansas may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

Kansas's execution-time unconscionability ground also requires all three statutory disclosure conditions: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no voluntary express written waiver, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.

A Kansas court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Kansas tolls an applicable limitations period for a claim under a premarital agreement during marriage while preserving equitable time defenses including laches and estoppel.

Kansas enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act in 1988, directs uniform construction, and applies it to agreements executed on or after its July 1, 1988 effective date.

Davis identifies circumstances relevant to voluntariness, disclosure, knowledge, counsel, timing, and bargaining context, and enforced the parties' contractual choice to apply the Kansas Act to the postnuptial agreement before the court.

Nelson applies whole-document construction to an unambiguous premarital agreement and held that unambiguous joint-tenancy deeds controlled without parol evidence used to impeach their written terms.

An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than mutual promises to marry, must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or that party's authorized agent to support an action.

Chapter 403 supplies current property, maintenance, child-support, custody, fee, and dissolution rules that operate alongside a premarital agreement.

Kentucky excludes from marital property property excluded by a valid agreement, while Gentry permits parties to define rights in property otherwise governed by section 403.190.

Section 403.180 governs written separation agreements and makes non-child terms binding unless unconscionable, but expressly excludes custody, support, and visitation terms from that binding rule.

Section 403.200 supplies default eligibility, amount, and duration factors for maintenance; a waiver remains subject to the agreement's text and Lane's case-specific unconscionability review.

Current guideline amounts are a rebuttable presumption; any deviation requires statutory grounds and court findings, and a parental agreement alone cannot absolutely waive the support obligation.

A court must determine custody under the child's best interests and current statutory presumptions and factors, so a premarital custody allocation cannot bind the future court.

Gentry recognizes divorce-related premarital property agreements that were freely, knowingly, and voluntarily executed after full disclosure, subject to review for defects, unconscionability, and materially changed circumstances.

Gentry's first criterion asks whether fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts affected the agreement.

Gentry requires review for unconscionability, including whether the agreement was manifestly unfair when executed.

A court must examine the agreement when enforcement is sought and may refuse enforcement if later facts and circumstances make it unconscionable, unfair, or unreasonable.

Parties may define rights in property they own at marriage or later acquire, and Gentry enforced the exact ownership allocation including jointly titled property rather than substituting a generic separate-property result.

Gentry separately affirmed a statutory maintenance award and emphasized that the premarital agreement before it did not waive maintenance.

The spouse giving up rights must be fully apprised of the extent and nature of the other estate and the value of the rights surrendered.

The party relying on a prenuptial agreement bears the burden of proving full disclosure of assets at signing.

Kentucky has long recognized premarital agreements intended to operate at death, but the scope of any dower, elective, or estate-right release and the disclosure record must be proved.

A trial court may modify or invalidate all or part of a premarital agreement when enforcement is unconscionable; Lane affirmed relief from a total maintenance waiver based on the first marriage, children, homemaking, career effects, growing disparity, and the agreement's combined restrictions.

Kentucky reviews agreements case by case and permits modification or invalidation of all or part where application is unconscionable, with deference to supported trial-court findings.

Kentucky's current statute of frauds states no fixed premarital waiting period; timing remains evidence relevant to Gentry's fraud, duress, mistake, and voluntary-execution analysis rather than a numerical safe harbor.

Kentucky's writing statute does not make separate counsel an execution formality, but advice, conflicts, understanding, and opportunity to negotiate remain important evidence under Gentry and Lane's fairness review.

Kentucky has no UPAA-style general amendment-and-revocation section for prenups; a claimed later change must be classified under the agreement, statute of frauds, contract law, or the distinct separation-agreement statute.

Kentucky construes the actual trigger and operative language; Chenault treated its agreement as directed to death rather than divorce, so labels and general recitals cannot replace close textual analysis.

A parent's obligation to support a child may not be absolutely waived by private contract; any different amount remains subject to the statutes, proof, and court review.

Kentucky has not enacted a UPAA or UPMAA applicability schedule; Gentry recognized divorce-related enforcement in 1990 and overruled inconsistent older public-policy cases, so historical agreements require then-current law.

A matrimonial agreement made before or during marriage must be an authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses.

A matrimonial agreement establishes a separation-of-property regime or modifies or terminates the legal regime, while unexcluded provisions of the legal regime remain effective.

Spouses may agree before or during marriage on matters not prohibited by public policy, but a during-marriage modification or termination generally requires a joint petition and findings that it serves their best interests and that they understand the governing rules.

An authentic act requires execution before an authorized notary or officer in the presence of two witnesses and signatures by each executing party, each witness, and each notary, subject to the article's separate-execution rules.

A party may duly acknowledge a private signature by recognizing it before a court, notary, or other authorized officer in the presence of two witnesses, or in another legally authorized manner.

A private-signature premarital agreement must be duly acknowledged before marriage; later acknowledgment does not cure the missing pre-marriage form without satisfying the during-marriage regime-change rules.

Spouses may not alter the marital portion or established succession order and may not limit, as to third persons, specified powers that one spouse has under the legal regime over community obligations and property.

A matrimonial agreement affects third persons as to immovables when filed in the conveyance records where the property is situated and as to movables when filed where the spouses are domiciled.

Parties cannot derogate by juridical act from laws enacted to protect the public interest; a contrary act is absolutely null.

Consent to a contract may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress, and those conventional-obligation grounds apply to matrimonial agreements alongside their special form rules.

Duress vitiates consent when it causes reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to person, property, or reputation, considering the party's age, health, disposition, and other personal circumstances.

A threat to do a lawful act or exercise a right generally is not duress, although an act lawful only in appearance may qualify.

Burtner affirmed enforcement of an authentic-act agreement signed three days before the wedding on credibility findings that rejected fraud and duress; Louisiana has no fixed numerical waiting period.

Burtner treated advice to seek independent counsel and the opportunity record as evidence bearing on consent, but Louisiana's matrimonial-agreement articles do not make separate counsel an execution formality.

McAlpine holds that a premarital waiver of permanent post-divorce support is not automatically void as against public policy and may be enforced subject to ordinary contract-rescission grounds.

A support-waiving antenuptial agreement remains subject to the same rescission grounds as other contracts, and McAlpine upheld the agreement after rejecting undue duress on its record.

Louisiana's matrimonial-agreement articles contain no UPAA-style disclosure safe harbor; asset schedules, representations, and actual knowledge remain important evidence for fraud, error, scope, and informed consent.

A during-marriage agreement that modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime generally requires a joint petition and court findings on best interests and understanding of the governing principles and rules.

During the first year after moving to and acquiring a Louisiana domicile, spouses may enter a matrimonial agreement without court approval.

Current law separately authorizes interim and final periodic support and applies distinct needs, ability-to-pay, fault, duration, and domestic-abuse rules.

In divorce proceedings the court must award custody according to the child's best interest, so a premarital custody allocation cannot bind the future court.

The child-support guidelines presumptively supply the proper amount; a deviation requires court review, statutory grounds, reasons, and attention to the child's best interest.

Crow affirmed enforcement after finding insufficient proof of error and explained that joint tax filing or acquiring property during marriage did not automatically convert the agreed separate-property regime.

Louisiana's current matrimonial-regime framework derives from the 1979 enactment, with article 2329 amended in 1980; Louisiana has no UPAA or UPMAA applicability schedule.

Maine defines a premarital agreement as one between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage, and defines property to include present, future, legal, equitable, vested, contingent, real, personal, income, and earnings interests.

A Maine premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

Maine lists property rights and management, disposition, spousal support, estate planning, insurance, choice of law, and other lawful personal rights and obligations as permitted subjects.

A Maine premarital agreement may not adversely affect a child's right to support.

A Maine premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage.

For covered older agreements, Maine makes the agreement void 18 months after the parties become parents or guardians of a minor unless they timely sign a written amendment preserving or altering it; section 606 does not apply to agreements executed on or after October 1, 1993.

After marriage, amendment or revocation requires a written agreement signed by both parties and is enforceable without consideration.

The party resisting enforcement in Maine may prove that the agreement was not executed voluntarily.

Maine's execution-time unconscionability ground also examines fair and reasonable disclosure, express written waiver, and adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.

A Maine court may require support to the extent necessary to avoid public-assistance eligibility caused by a premarital support modification or elimination.

If a marriage is void, an otherwise premarital agreement is enforceable only as necessary to avoid an inequitable result.

Maine tolls an applicable limitations period during marriage, preserves laches and estoppel, and directs uniform construction.

Dow applies whole-document interpretation and requires a clear and unmistakable waiver before a general provision surrenders important statutory marital-property rights.

Hutchinson reads the agreement as a whole, enforced broad reciprocal business-asset waivers, and required further consideration of a remedy for a promised condominium purchase that did not occur.

Spouses may make valid and enforceable deeds, agreements, and settlements concerning alimony, support, property rights, or personal rights.

Cannon restates Maryland's antenuptial-agreement framework, including the confidential relationship, enforcement burden, overreaching, disclosure or knowledge, voluntariness, counsel opportunity, and execution-time fairness.

Maryland has no comprehensive UPAA-style execution statute; Cannon reviewed a signed and notarized written agreement but did not create a universal statutory witness, notary, or waiting-period safe harbor.

Antenuptial agreements are contracts interpreted under Maryland's objective law of contract interpretation, with attention to the executed language, consideration, and objective intent.

When marriage is the consideration for an antenuptial agreement, a confidential relationship exists between the parties as a matter of law at formation.

Because of the confidential relationship, the party seeking enforcement bears the ultimate burden of proving the agreement's validity and absence of overreaching.

The central inquiry is whether unfairness or inequity existed in the result or procurement within the confidential relationship, including substantive commensurateness and free, understanding assent.

Full, frank, and truthful disclosure of property and financial interests can establish that the waiving party knew what rights were being relinquished and defeat an overreaching claim.

Actual knowledge of the other party's property and finances may substitute for full disclosure when sufficient to understand what is being waived.

Like other contracts, antenuptial agreements may be attacked for fraud, duress, coercion, mistake, undue influence, incompetence, or execution-time unconscionability.

Opportunity to obtain independent counsel is an important factor in whether the agreement was voluntarily and understandingly made, but counsel is not a categorical execution formality.

Maryland has no fixed premarital waiting period; Cannon evaluated delivery, discussion, opportunity for advice, and voluntariness on the complete chronology.

If allowance and waiver terms are unfairly disproportionate at execution, the enforcing party must prove that overreaching did not occur using factors including disclosure, counsel opportunity, and knowing voluntary relinquishment.

Stewart describes unconscionability as requiring extreme unfairness reflected in lack of meaningful choice and terms unreasonably favoring the other party, while preserving Cannon's specific overreaching framework.

Stewart upheld an agreement where the spouse knew the principal assets and their potential value, read and understood the agreement, retained significant rights, and was not threatened or misled.

Current definitions exclude property from family-home, family-use, or marital-property treatment when a valid agreement applies, subject to the exact subsection and asset.

For agreements within the statute's date ranges, courts may modify spousal-support provisions unless the instrument contains the specified nonmodification language or an express waiver.

A court may modify any agreement term concerning a minor child's care, custody, education, or support when modification serves the child's best interests.

Courts must use Maryland's child-support guidelines, with a rebuttable presumption and specific findings for a deviation that address the child's best interests.

A surviving spouse's election rights may be waived before or after marriage by a written contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the waiving party, with statutory consequences for broad all-rights language.

Absent explicit language to the contrary, an antenuptial agreement ordinarily continues until its conditions are discharged at death or divorce; an unstated temporary purpose does not rewrite the executed duration.

Maryland has no UPAA-style general amendment-and-revocation section; a claimed later change must be proved under the agreement's text, objective contract law, and any remedy- or transaction-specific statute.

Frey removed Maryland's former public-policy distinction against antenuptial agreements contemplating divorce and applied the Hartz validity factors to such agreements.

Maryland has no enacted UPAA or UPMAA applicability schedule; section 8-103 separately uses January 1 and April 13, 1976 date boundaries for support modification, while Cannon supplies the modern common-law framework.

Before marriage, parties may make a written contract concerning property or rights of action held when marriage occurs; its limitations take effect upon marriage as if in a deed.

A clearly descriptive property schedule must be annexed, and the contract and schedule recorded before marriage or within ninety days afterward in the specified registry and where affected land lies.

Massachusetts recognizes premarital settlement of divorce-related property and spousal-support consequences, subject to validity, conscionability, and nonwaivable limits.

DeMatteo requires a first look at execution-time fairness and reasonableness and a second look at enforcement-time conscionability.

The waiving party must be informed of the other's worth or have adequate knowledge, and disclosure must permit a reasonable decision whether to proceed.

Prospective spouses stand in a confidential relationship and must deal fairly and understandingly when making a premarital agreement.

The first look considers knowledge, disclosure, waiver language, counsel, review opportunity, understanding, and absence of overreaching.

Separate counsel and meaningful review opportunity strongly inform knowing and voluntary execution but are not categorical execution formalities.

Massachusetts has no fixed waiting period; courts assess delivery, drafts, negotiation, counsel work, wedding pressure, and understanding on the full chronology.

The agreement must set forth the rights relinquished so the waiver can be evaluated as knowing, fair, and understanding.

Changed circumstances may make enforcement unconscionable if they leave a spouse without sufficient property, maintenance, or employment capacity for self-support.

Potential public-charge consequences and conflict with a child's best interests exemplify limits private premarital terms cannot conclusively control.

Rudnick found enforcement unconscionable where breached title promises and the agreement left an elderly spouse without marital property, alimony, or sufficient resources.

Austin enforced a negotiated waiver after finding execution validity and enforcement-time conscionability because meaningful assets and resources remained.

An enforceable agreement remains a contract whose language, definitions, schedules, triggers, and integrated obligations must be construed.

Massachusetts has no UPAA-style general amendment section; a claimed change must satisfy the agreement, contract doctrine, and transaction-specific writing, deed, probate, or recording rules.

For a qualifying written property contract, limitations upon property rights take effect when marriage occurs as if contained in a deed.

Courts retain authority over custody, care, maintenance, and education of minor children under child-focused standards and continuing modification power.

Child-support orders follow current law and the guideline presumption, subject to lawful deviation findings rather than a prospective private waiver.

A postjudgment child-support agreement cannot bar modification without statutory findings, including guideline consistency and the child's best interests.

A premarital agreement cannot eliminate statutory authority to award funds or expenses needed to litigate validity and the domestic-relations proceeding.

Stacy enforced plain premarital language waiving claims to identified separate property at death and excluded it from the surviving spouse's intestate-share calculation.

Rosenberg made its revised rules prospective for instruments executed after publication, requiring historical-law analysis for earlier agreements.

Massachusetts has no enacted UPAA or UPMAA schedule; execution date, marriage date, Rosenberg's line, amendments, and remedy determine governing law.